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BY  BENJAMIN  STOREY
Times have changed since 1837. Our scholarly establishment bears only the vaguest resemblance 
to the one Emerson attacked. Yet we, too, have our 
characteristic blind spots and weaknesses. What are 
they? Are we still the passive bookworms Emerson 
described, or do our dif!culties lie elsewhere?     
The most obvious problem with American higher 
education today is its grotesque sticker price. For this, 
there is plenty of blame to go around. Administrators 
build legacies by creating programs and positions to 
address campus concerns, both real and imaginary; 
these things cost money. Faculty want raises, 
sabbaticals and research support; these things also 
cost money. Parents and students want nice gyms 
and dining halls and dorm rooms, freshly mown grass, 
ubiquitous Wi-Fi, and, above all, that priceless bubble, 
reputation. All these things cost money.
But the deeper problem with the contemporary 
state of American higher education is not !nancial 
or even institutional, but philosophical. The present 
generation of administrators and faculty is not very 
good at explaining what a liberal education is, and 
In 1837, Ralph Waldo Emerson delivered a withering critique of the state of American higher education to the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard. His speech, 
“The American Scholar,” bristled with barbs at the 
bearded sages who made up his audience — the Harvard 
faculty, which had considered Emerson a mediocrity 
when he was their student. 
 First, he attacked their worship of old books. 
“Meek young men,” Emerson said, “grow up in libraries, 
believing it their duty to accept the view which Cicero, 
which Locke, which Bacon, have given.” When they 
accept this authority, he went on, “instantly the book 
becomes noxious; the guide is a tyrant,” and the reader 
is reduced to a mere “bookworm.” 
 Second, he chided the members of America’s pre-
eminent learned society for their lack of engagement 
in active life: a man who lives a life without action, 
he said, “is not yet a man.” Emerson thus argued for 
liberation from the tyranny of old books and the 
embrace of the active life as a corrective to the vices 
of contemplativeness that, in his view, plagued the 
scholarly audience before him.
why students and parents should pay the exorbitant 
price we charge for it.       
When asked to explain ourselves, faculty and 
administrators face two opposed temptations. One 
is to wrap ourselves in the mantle of faculty self-
governance, haughtily asserting that we do not need 
to justify our activity to students or their parents, but 
only to each other, as we bearers of Ph.D.s are the only 
competent judges of what constitutes a liberal educa-
tion. Behind closed doors, we go along to get along, 
indulging our colleagues’ research interests, their 
political hobby-horses, and even their actual hobbies, 
resulting in incoherent curricula cobbled together out 
of courses such as “Sur!ng and American Culture” and 
“The Horror Film in Context” (real courses, presently 
taught at prestigious American universities). In the face 
of this distinctly academic combination of arrogance 
and fecklessness, increasing public demands for 
greater accountability are understandable.       
This leads to the alternative temptation, perhaps 
even more dangerous: justifying what we do in terms 
of the commercial marketplace. 
The virtues of liberal education — and why it is worth pursuing.
ILLUSTRATIONS  BY  MICHAEL  GLENWOOD
OF bookworms
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Since we’re asking for a $200,000 
investment, we justify its worth in 
terms of its effect on one’s standard 
of living. There is some truth to 
this; college graduates earn about 
$1 million more over a lifetime than 
high school graduates, according to 
the census bureau. But the use of 
this kind of cost-bene!t analysis to 
justify liberal education is a danger-
ous game. The economic bene!ts 
of vocational courses in nursing 
or information technology, for 
example, are far more apparent than 
those of courses in Shakespeare, 
theoretical physics, or my own 
discipline, political philosophy —
areas traditionally understood to be 
at the heart of liberal education.     
To be clear, I have no intention 
of disparaging nursing or informa-
tion technology. Nurses and com-
puter technicians do real and palpable good in the world, more so than 
many college professors. But vocational education and liberal education 
are not the same thing.       
What, then, is a liberal education, and why is one worth pursuing? 
What can liberal arts colleges such as Furman say to justify their pricey 
existence when Americans have begun to question the costs of higher 
education with growing and justi!ed intensity?     
A powerful argument in defense of liberal education was once 
offered by one of modern society’s most acute observers, Alexis de 
Tocqueville. At the very same moment when Emerson was arguing 
that American higher education was excessively bookish and too far 
removed from practical life, Tocqueville argued for the opposite view. 
For Tocqueville, one of the de!ning characteristics of a commercial 
democracy like ours is its restless mobility, its busyness. Tocqueville 
knew that the restless activity of American society is part-and-parcel 
of its distinctive excellences: its extraordinary freedom and widespread 
prosperity, which he celebrated. However, no society enjoys all good 
things, and Tocqueville pointed out that an excessive and narrow 
attachment to activity, business, practicality and change is our 
characteristic vice. We Americans tend to become not bookworms, 
but busybodies.     
Universities, in Tocqueville’s view, can be seen as points of resistance 
to this American tendency, islands of patience in a culture of haste. 
In this, he alerts us to one of the many meanings of the word “liberal” 
in liberal education: liberal in the sense of free from the day-to-day 
pressures of productive life. Of what 
use is liberal education — under-
stood, in this Tocquevillean way, 
as a little taste of a contemplative 
leisure more at home in aristocratic 
societies — to people who are 
not aristocrats and have no 
intention of spending their lives 
locked in libraries?
A liberal arts education can
serve as an introduction to a 
variety of activities that constitute 
the leisurely, contemplative way 
of life celebrated by the Western 
philosophic tradition. Foremost 
among these activities are the 
intensive study of old books, 
friendship centered on conversa-
tion, and the cultivation of the 
capacity and taste for solitary 
re"ection. A liberal arts education 
can nurture all of these activities, 
begetting a lifelong disposition to engage in them. 
For now, I want to argue for the importance of the !rst activity 
I mentioned — studying old books with precisely the kind of devotion 
Emerson attacked in “The American Scholar.” What good does this 
activity do for students, particularly those who do not plan to be 
scholars? What does it offer them in terms of the roles they can 
expect to play in life when they leave college — as someone’s future 
husband or wife, as someone else’s future mother or father, and as 
a human being who longs for happiness and desires to understand 
his or her place in the world?     
A comment from the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides a useful starting point for considering this question. According 
to Rousseau, philosophy is something “man needs in order to be able 
to observe once what he has seen every day.” Rousseau was famous for 
his paradoxes, and this statement is surely one of them. After all, what 
can it mean to say that we need something as abstruse as philosophy 
to observe what we see every day — the things most familiar to us?     
Another philosopher, Josef Pieper, helps us understand what 
Rousseau is driving at. Pieper offers a telling critique of the limits 
of the mind of the bourgeois, the productive citizen of a commercial 
democracy (that is, of all of us, insofar as we are all citizens of such 
a regime and must work for a living). The bourgeois, for Pieper, “accepts 
his environment de!ned as it is by the immediate needs of life.” When 
we look at the world, we tend to see everything in terms of its utility 
or practical signi!cance. We see that money, for example, is an 
eminently useful thing, and rarely interrogate its meaning further. 
We see that food is useful for eating, and rarely wonder what it means 
to be a being that eats.     
This ready-made utilitarian perspective on the world is indispensible 
to all of us insofar as we are practical beings. We do not ordinarily ask 
what stop lights mean; we stop, as we should. However, to see something 
in practical and utilitarian terms is to take its meaning for granted, and 
this way of looking at the world tends to become all-pervasive. Bit by 
bit, Pieper cautions, we slip into taking “everything for granted,” which 
leads him to wonder, “Are we to take our very existence for granted?” 
Surely there are some things — love, family, nature, God, our own souls 
— we do not wish to take for granted. After all, to see one’s spouse or 
one’s children in utilitarian terms is not to see them at all.     
To see the people around us and the natural whole we inhabit 
on their own terms, to wonder at them and encounter them in their 
full mysteriousness, requires that we struggle against the grain of the 
practical and utilitarian perspective that is necessarily dominant in our 
lives as working Americans. Here, the liberal arts can help. Indeed, the 
liberal arts can be understood as nothing less than the arts that teach 
us how to avoid taking our existence for granted.       
If the point of liberal education is to help us see things with fresh eyes, and thereby really see them, what can it mean to say that intensive, 
even reverent, study of old books is at the heart of such an education? 
How can the encounter with the old help us to see things anew?     
As an example of how an old book can teach us really to see things, 
as if for the !rst time, consider what one might learn about love from 
Plato’s Symposium. Popular culture is endlessly productive of songs and 
!lms and YouTube clips that offer to teach us love’s meaning, some of 
which have interesting and true things to say. But their range is limited, 
for they are the products of a relatively narrow and familiar slice of 
history and usually offer slight variations on themes we’ve heard before, 
rather than shocking us into seeing a phenomenon such as love in all 
of its real and invigorating strangeness.     
The myth told by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium is a perfect 
window into that strangeness. According to Aristophanes, each of us 
once had four legs, four arms, two faces, and two sets of genitals. We ran 
by tumbling in a circle, “were awesome in strength and robustness,” had 
“great and proud thoughts,” and therefore launched an assault on the 
gods. The gods defeated us, and punished and hobbled us by cutting us 
in half, an operation that left us longing for our primordial wholeness. 
Aristophanes calls that longing eros, “the bringer together of [our] 
ancient nature,” “the desire and pursuit of the whole,” the search for 
that missing half of ourselves that alone could make us feel complete 
again. Aristophanes thus explains why human love longs not merely 
for sex, but for embracing one another and holding each other tight — 
as if trying to form a physical whole out of two irremediably separate 
bodies — for his myth describes those embraces as our response to our 
experience of ourselves as painfully, almost unnaturally, incomplete. 
A few pages later, Plato has Socrates recount the lessons in love 
taught him by a mysterious wise-woman named Diotima. According 
to Diotima, “eros is the whole desire of good things and being happy.” 
It is the ubiquitous longing felt by every human soul for the all-
comprehensive "ourishing which alone, for the ancients, merited the 
name happiness. Diotima explicitly contrasts her view to Aristophanes’ 
claim that love is a longing for physical wholeness, “for human beings 
are willing to have their own feet and hands cut off if their opinion 
is that [they] are no good.” 
Plato thus gives us two accounts of love, both profoundly evocative,
but plainly in con"ict with each other — which is precisely his inten-
tion. For the con"icts between these two accounts of love force us to 
wonder whether love is, most fundamentally, the desire for happiness 
or the desire for wholeness. To ask that question is to ask the Socratic 
questions that unify Plato’s dialogue: What unites the many phenomena 
that we refer to as love? What is love, in and of itself? What does this 
longing, so potent in all of us, long for?                 
Plato’s dialogue does not tell us what the answer is but leads us, 
instead, to interrogate our own experience. He thereby turns our 
experience into a question for us, which is in some ways to show 
us that experience for the !rst time. For it is when we experience 
a phenomenon such as love as mysterious, as inexplicable in terms 
of the clichés we have all learned to parrot about it, that we really 
see it with our own eyes — really experience it. Strangely enough, 
this self-aware, experientially lively ignorance has to be learned. 
This is precisely what the liberal arts have to teach.                
One could give countless further examples of phenomena old 
books can teach us really to see for the !rst time. Concerning children, 
John Locke quotes a marvelous aphorism from an ancient author: 
“the greatest reverence is owed to children.” We tend, rightly, to revere 
the old; Locke here suggests that we also revere the new. For our 
example, as Locke points out, always leaves its mark on these mysterious 
little bundles of possibility, who will, eventually, replace us. On Locke’s 
account, being in the presence of one’s children, exacting observers 
that they are, is not a little like being in church.
When it comes to our happiness, Aristotle can help us see it anew 
when he argues that happiness is a life dedicated to “the activity of 
the soul in accordance with virtue.” Raised as we are amid swarms 
of hedonistic images that might lead us to believe that happiness 
consists of a limitless pig-out enjoyed before a never-ending Super 
Bowl, Aristotle’s argument reminds us that we feel ourselves most 
alive, and experience our being most fully and joyously, not when we 
belly up to the trough but when we put our beings to work, exercising 
our highest faculties not for the sake of pro!t but because such activity 
The liberal arts can be understood as nothing less than the arts 
that teach us how to avoid taking our existence for granted.       
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Americans, who care so much about the 
goods of the body, are nonetheless keenly 
aware that we also have souls, and that 
souls need their own kind of food.
As Peter Lawler of Berry College, who 
spoke at Furman in 2010 as part of the 
Tocqueville Program Lecture Series, has 
pointed out, the Puritans believed that 
“nobody was above work, and nobody 
was below leisurely contemplation about 
our true destiny.” In this sense, while 
liberal education may seem impractical 
when considered from the vantage point 
of the commercial marketplace, it looks 
distinctly more practical if we ask what is 
practical for beings who are more than just bodies, and are possessed 
of more than just bodily needs.
Perhaps Emerson was right to warn the Harvard faculty about 
the tyranny of old books and the vices of idleness in 1837. Over the 
long term, however, it seems to me that Tocqueville more deeply 
understood the relationship between liberty and liberal education 
in democratic times. For Tocqueville understood that hyperactivity, 
not idleness, is the characteristic vice of democratic peoples, and 
that the present, not the past, is most prone to tyrannize over the 
democratic mind. If liberal education can liberate the mind from 
that tyranny, one could seriously defend it as priceless.      
“Priceless,” however, is a vague term, and a liberal education 
in our time costs an enormous amount of very real money. Can 
universities justify charging, can families justify paying, all those 
hard-earned dollars for what liberal education has to offer? That 
is for administrations, faculties, students and parents to decide.
But perhaps we can think more clearly about the proper price of 
a liberal education if we see it for what it truly is. Liberal education, 
rightly understood, is the most useful tool available to us in what 
George Orwell called the “constant struggle” necessary “to see what 
is right in front of one’s face.” Liberal education, rightly understood, 
is the education that liberates the human person from the very real 
and costly temptation to take one’s whole existence for granted. |F|  
The author, an associate professor of political science, joined the Furman 
faculty in 2005.
is intrinsically delightful. Given this under-
standing, the seminar room, the surgeon’s 
theatre, the basketball court and the soup 
kitchen are all more likely places to look for 
happiness than the bar or the beach.
Finally, on the question of the character 
of the world in which we !nd ourselves, the 
book of Genesis can help us see that world 
anew by raising what is perhaps the most 
basic questions there are: Why does the 
whole, the universe, exist at all? Why do we 
experience it as beautiful, and as ordered in 
a way our minds can, at least partially, under-
stand? Giving full and !nal answers to such 
questions is, of course, probably beyond the 
capacity of the human mind. Nonetheless, by raising those ques-
tions, Genesis can allow us to see the world not as a mere collection 
of natural resources to be exploited for our practical bene!t but as 
an astonishing marvel at whose source we can only wonder.   
 
By opening our eyes to the strangeness of our life and its many gifts, old books can thus help us to experience love, family, hap-
piness, and the question of the whole on their own terms. One does 
not necessarily need to go to college to experience this revelation, 
but it helps. 
The books I’ve drawn on are from distant times and places. 
They contain strange images, demanding arguments, and paradoxi-
cal propositions that are most dif!cult to understand, particularly 
on a !rst reading. To pierce them requires a level of attention almost 
impossible to give them when immersed in the responsibilities 
of post-collegiate life, when work and children typically demand 
the best of one’s time and energy. Leisure, guidance from properly 
trained teachers, and the company of fellow inquirers who share 
the openness characteristic of the young can be enormously useful 
in the study of such dif!cult yet rewarding texts. The university is 
uniquely suited to provide a home for this impractical yet demanding 
activity in a relentlessly practical world.     
It is a remarkable testament to the unique genius of our country 
that, in spite of its utilitarian and commercial nature, it has seen !t 
to make this kind of education, truly liberal education, the passkey 
to its most respected professions and a widely available, if expen-
sive, good. It has perhaps done so because, from our Puritan origins, 
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Alexis de Tocqueville by Theodore Chassereau
FURMAN’S TOCQUEVILLE PROGRAM LECTURE Series brings prominent scholars and public intellectuals to campus to engage the moral questions at the heart 
of political life.
The program takes its name from Alexis de Tocqueville, 
perhaps the greatest student of modern democracy, who under-
stood both the dif!culty and the necessity of reminding citizens 
of a decent and prosperous regime about questions of truth, 
nobility and eternity. These questions are not always comfortable 
to discuss and are never easily resolved. However, as Tocqueville 
understood, they cannot be ignored by those who seek to live 
lives of freedom and dignity. 
 This spring, the Tocqueville Program (schedule left) is focus-
ing on the theme of “Liberal Education and Liberal Democracy.” 
From the beginning of the American Republic, the best statesmen 
and thinkers have seen an essential connection between liberal 
democracy and liberal education. According to Thomas Jefferson, 
the extensive educational plan he proposed for his native Virginia 
was a necessary means for “rendering the people the safe, as they 
are the ultimate, guardians of their own liberty.”
The rigorous education in politics and history Jefferson envi-
sioned, however, has little relation to what is taught in American 
universities today. In spite of a price tag that strains the limits 
of middle-class credulity, universities and colleges often offer 
curricula with little apparent coherence and seem increasingly 
incapable of articulating the high and noble purpose of liberal 
education in a democratic society. Thus the effort to answer the 
question, “What is liberal education?”
Contact benjamin.storey@furman.edu to learn more about the 
Tocqueville Program. 
This essay emerged from the inaugural Francis W. Bonner American Scholar 
Lecture, delivered by Benjamin Storey on August 31, 2011. The lecture series 
was established by Furman’s Phi Beta Kappa Society (Gamma of South 
Carolina) to recognize the spirit and tradition of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
Phi Beta Kappa lecture on August 31, 1837.
The series highlights the ideals of Phi Beta Kappa, the nation’s oldest 
academic honor society, and the centrality of liberal learning in the American 
experience, and is designed to give students a better sense of how their degrees 
!t into a broader world of ideas at the commencement of a new academic 
year. It is named in honor and memory of Francis Bonner, longtime university 
provost and academic dean, who championed the establishment of a Phi Beta 
Kappa chapter at Furman.
